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Over- and Under-Investment 







Abstract. In a two-stage oligopoly, with investment in the first stage and quantity or 
price competition in the second stage, there is a kind of Folk Theorem: We find (i) 
over-investment  if  the  goods  are  substitutes  and  competition  is  in  strategic 
substitutes,  (ii)  under-investment  if  we  have  either  complements  instead  of 
substitutes or strategic complements instead of strategic substitutes, and (iii) again 
over-investment if both attributes change. The existing literature, however, lacks a 
proof  of  this  theorem  and,  in  particular,  it  lacks  a  systematic  comparison  of  the 
different  benchmarks  for  over-  and  under-investment.  A  “naive”  benchmark  is  the 
efficient  investment  with  respect  to  the  subgame  perfect  (closed loop)  equilibrium 
quantities. Alternative benchmarks (which are more often proposed) are the open 
loop  equilibrium  investment  or  the  welfare  maximizing  investment.  The  chosen 
benchmark is critical because the Folk Theorem applies (under certain conventional 
conditions)  only  for  the  naïve  benchmark.  The  other  two  benchmarks  require 
additional assumptions or the distinction of subcases.  
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I. Introduction  
 
A  two-stage  model  with  investment  in  the  first  period  and  quantity  or  price 
competition in the second seems to be a simple but appropriate model for long-term 
competition in an oligopoly. Higher investment usually decreases marginal costs, e.g. 
via  economies  of  scale  or  via  R&D  for  cost  saving  technologies.  Beginning  with 
Spence (1977), a large number of models with this structure has been discussed. 
The  usual  assumptions  in  the  literature  (with  some  exceptions)  are  “quantity 
competition with substitutes and strategic substitutes”. Often homogeneous goods 
and/or duopolies are assumed.  
 
Sometimes interest is focussed on market entry where the model structure is slightly 
altered: only the incumbent invests in period 1 while the entrant chooses investment 
(possibly equal to 0, i.e. no entry) and price or quantity simultaneously in period 2. In 
particular, the seminal work of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow et al. (1983) 
has lead to the impression that the logic of such models is principally understood. 
 
The consequences of such a model structure are often described as over- or under-
investment. While Brander and Spencer (1983) evaluate investment with respect to 
the “naïve” benchmark
2 of whether the closed loop (subgame perfect) equilibrium 
quantities are produced efficiently, Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) as well as Bulow et 
al. (1985) propose the open loop equilibrium (where investment and prices/quantities 
are chosen simultaneously) as a benchmark for over- and under-investment. Their 
reasoning  is  that  the  open  loop  benchmark  incorporates  non-strategic  investment 
(efficient production of the open loop equilibrium quantities) so that “over” and “under” 
express the consequences of strategic considerations. We could also interpret such a 
benchmark as the goal of a regulator who wants production to be efficient. In the 
energy  sector,  for  example,  inefficient  production  may  be  accompanied  by 
unnecessarily high levels of CO2 emissions (under-investment) or too many highly 
controversial nuclear power plants (over-investment). The open loop benchmark is 
also used by Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993) and Murphy and Smeers (2005). 
 
                                            
2 This is an obvious benchmark. I call it naïve because it is difficult to see how and why regulation 
could and should implement this benchmark. 
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Many authors prefer to compare equilibrium investment in the two stage (closed loop) 
equilibrium  with  socially  optimal  investment,  usually  in  the  form of  a  second  best 
welfare  optimum.  Second  best  means  that  only  investment  is  regulated,  but  not 
competition in the second stage of the game. Suzumura (1992), and Okuno-Fujiwara 
and Suzumura (1993) apply this benchmark. In this paper, we want to concentrate on 
the three benchmarks mentioned above. 
 
There are papers which use other benchmarks, namely the first best welfare optimum 
(Suzumura, 1992; Elberfeld, 2003; Murphy and Smeers, 2005) or cooperation among 
the oligopolists in the first round (Suzumura, 1992; Long and Sobeyran, 2001). Some 
papers  are  not  directly  concerned  with  under-/over-investment  but  instead  study 
optimal taxes or subsidies (Besley and Suzumura, 1992; Vetter, 2007). As the above 
citations show, several papers use multiple benchmarks. On the other hand, there 
are  papers  which  investigate  the  subgame  perfect  equilibrium  (the  closed  loop 
solution) without comparisons (Tseng, 2003; Grant and Quiggin, 1996). 
 
 A number of two-stage games which seem to be different at first glance can be 
interpreted  in  the  above  frame  work  (see  Shapiro,  1989).  Allaz  (1992)  and  Bolle 
(1993), for example, discuss the consequences of the introduction of a futures market 
(for oligopolies such as electricity). In this case the benchmark is the non-existence of 
such  a  market  (zero  investment,  i.e.  buying/selling  of  futures  contracts).  Other 
applications may suggest further benchmarks. 
 
A common attribute of the three benchmarks which we will discuss is that there is 
oligopolistic competition in the second stage. Thus, it should not be too difficult to 
extend the investigation to the benchmark “cooperation of the oligopolists in the first 
stage” and to other benchmarks which share this common attribute. I think, however, 
such an extension would overload the paper. A general comparison with the first best 
welfare optimum would be more difficult because the decisions in the second stage 
are also involved. Discussing the first best optimum is often the same as substituting 
the industry with a regulated monopoly. 
 
There are a number of extensions of the basic model: more periods of investment 
(e.g.  Stanford,  1986;  Athey  and  Schmutzler,  2001;  Bolle  and  Breitmoser,  2004),   5
spillovers  in  R&D  (d'Aspremont  and  Jacquemin  1988;  Kamien  et  al.;  1992), 
incomplete information (Vives, 1989; Somma, 1999), and others. We will not consider 
such  extensions,  but  instead  concentrate  on  the  role  of  benchmarks  in  the  basic 
case. 
 
In the next section we describe the basic model and its subgame perfect equilibrium 
within a conventional model with minimal assumptions. In Section III, we add the 
(conventional) assumptions of symmetry and of stability of the second stage market 
and show that for the naïve benchmark, the following theorem applies:  
 
Folk  Theorem:  There  is  (i)  over-investment  if  the  goods  are  substitutes  and 
competition  is  in  strategic  substitutes,  (ii)  under-investment  if  we  have  either 
complements  instead  of  substitutes  or  strategic  complements  instead  of  strategic 
substitutes, and (iii) again over-investment if both attributes change. 
 
In Sections IV and V, we derive the results for the open-loop and for the (second 
best) welfare benchmark. Under the open loop benchmark, the Folk Theorem applies 
only for the case of strategic substitutes; under the welfare benchmark, it applies only 
for the case complements & strategic substitutes. In Section VI, a simple example is 
discussed which shows that for non-naïve benchmarks we indeed encounter more 
complicated cases. It is also shown that two extensions of the stability requirement 
do not affect this result. 
 
The main part of the paper concentrates on quantity competition in the second stage. 
The  investigation  of  price  competition  is  relegated  to  the  appendix.  It  implies  the 
same qualitative results as quantity competition. Section VII reports
3 and discusses 
the joint results, in particular the additional distinctions which must be introduced.   
 
II. Competition with cost functions  
 
In  principle,  we  may  distinguish  three  stages  of  decisions.  In  the  first  stage, 
technology is chosen, i.e. firms invest in R&D, buy patents, sign licence contracts, 
purchase sites, and seek strategic partnerships. In hierarchical production processes 
                                            
3 See Table 1 in Section VII. 
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“make or buy” decisions are also important. These decisions influence marginal costs 
mainly  due  to  the  choice  of  technology  but  also  because  of  license  fees, 
transportation  costs  (and  modes),  and  transaction  costs.  In  the  second  stage, 
capacity is built which may influence marginal costs due to economies of scale and 
scope.  In  the  third  stage,  we  have  competition  in  quantities,  prices,  or  other 
instruments. We will simplify this structure by merging stages 2 and 3. Alternatively 
we could merge stages 1 and 2 or we could analyse the three-stage game. Apart 
from the fact that we follow the bulk of the literature, both alternatives would be more 
complicated.  
 
The technologies available to firm i are described by a one-parameter family of cost 
functions  ( ) i i i i x , x , c C   =  quantity  produced  and    Î i c   R  =  real  number.  We 
require 
 
(1)  , 0 x / C i i > ¶ ¶       , 0 x / C 2
i i
2 > ¶ ¶     , 0 c x / C i i i
2 > ¶ ¶ ¶     . 0 c / C 2
i i
2 > ¶ ¶  
 
The first two requirements are standard. The third requirement is that the marginal 
cost curves increase in  i c . It is implicitly assumed that fixed costs decrease in  i c ; 
therefore  ( ) i i i x , c C   may  increase  or  decrease  in  i c .    The  last  requirement  must 
apply  for  interior  cost  minima.  For  the  following,  we  define  ( ) n 1 x ,..., x x =   and 
( ) n 1 c ,..., c c = . 
 
Game CC (competition with cost functions): 
Stage 1 (Technology Choice): Firm i chooses  i c ,  n ,..., 1 i = . 
Stage 2 (Competition with Quantities):  Firm i chooses  i x . Demand for the product of  
   firm i is described by the inverse demand function  ( ) x pi .  n ,..., 1 i = . 
 
We assume that interior equilibria of the game exist. We denote a subgame perfect 
equilibrium of game CC as  ( ) c c x ~   ), ( .  ) (c x describes the second stage equilibrium 
quantities  for  a  given  c.  The  efficient  cost  parameter  vector  c  for  the  quantities 
) ~ ( ~ c x x =  is denoted by  * c ~ . In this and the following section we apply the naïve   7
benchmark, i.e. we say that cost function competition results in over-investment if 
* c ~ c ~ <  and in under-investment if the opposite relations hold.  
 
The profit of firm i is  ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i x , c C x p x G - = . An interior second-stage equilibrium of 
the CC game  ( ) c x  satisfies 
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The total derivative of eq. (2) with  0 dx j =  for  k , i j ¹  provides us with the slope of i’s 
best reply function  ) x ( f x i i i - =  with respect to  k x . 
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Because of relation (3), we have strategic substitutes (complements) if 






















(A1)  The second stage equilibria  ( ) c x  are unique differentiable functions of c . 
 
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem, we obtain  
 




























































  is  a  diagonal  matrix  with  negative  diagonal  elements  i i i












































 (because of eq. (3)) 

















 (<0 for strategic substitutes).  
 
 Firm i’s best reply to  i c- , the technology choice of the other firms, is derived from 
 







































































, we get 
 




























Contrary to eq. (8), cost efficiency requires 
 















For equilibrium values, the difference between eqs. (8) and (9) is 
 

















The implicit function   i i i z ~ c / C = ¶ ¶  lies above (below)   0 c / C i i = ¶ ¶  if the sign of   i z ~  
is positive (negative). 
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Definition: The following derivatives are evaluated at  ( ) c ~   , x ~ . We set   1 : g + = if all 
0 x / p k i > ¶ ¶ , i.e. if goods are complements, and   1 : g - = if all  0 x / p k i < ¶ ¶ , i.e. if 
goods  are  substitutes.  Otherwise,  we  set  0 : g = .  We  define 
0 dc / dx all if 1 : h k i > + =   and  0 dc / dx all if 1 : h k i < - = .  Otherwise,  we  set 
0 : h = . 
 
Proposition 1: If  ) 1 ( 1 h g + - = * , then  x ~ is produced with over-investment (under-
investment) according to the naïve benchmark. 
 
Proof:  Because  of  relations  (1),  the  implicit  functions  ) c ( x i i   defined  by 
const c / C i i = ¶ ¶   have  a  negative  slope.  ) 1 ( 1 h g - + = *   means  that  the  implicit 
function   i i i z ~ c / C = ¶ ¶  lies above (below)   0 c / C i i = ¶ ¶  . (See Figure 1.)
■  
 
We could generalize Proposition 1 by defining  i g  and  i h  for every firm i separately, 
i.e.  Proposition  1  applies  also  for  a  market  where  some  goods  are  (strategic) 














Figure 1: An equilibrium A of the CC game and efficient production of the equilibrium 
quantity in the case  0 z ~




0 c / C i i = ¶ ¶  
i i i z ~ c / C = ¶ ¶  
 
i c  
D 
i x  
i c ~
  * c ~
i  
i x ~  
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The sign of h can be determined by the Implicit Function Theorem – but that requires 
either numerical values or special cases. In the next section, we assume symmetric 
and stable
4 equilibria, in which case we obtain  1 h - =  for strategic complements and 
1 h + =  for strategic substitutes.  
 




(A2)        The game CC is symmetric and has interior symmetric equilibria ( ) c c x ~   ), ( . 
 
(A3)       The symmetric second stage equilibria of the CC game are stable. 
 
In symmetric games, all producers can choose from the same set of technologies. 
For symmetric (inverse) demand functions pi(x) the variables  j x  and  k x , i
≠ j,k, are 
interchangeable and we have ,...) , ,..., , (..., ,...) , ,..., , (..., 1 1 1 1 i k k i k k k i i i x x x x p x x x x p - - - - = . 
In a symmetric equilibrium all  i c  are equal, i.e. we have  ) ,..., ( 0 0 c c c c
s = = . The 
second stage equilibrium  ) (
s c x  shows  ) ( : ) ( ... ) ( 0 1
s s
n
s c x c x c x = = = . Evaluated 
















  has  identical  diagonal  elements 
α <0  and 
identical non-diagonal elements 
β .  
 
In  the  second  stage  of  the  CC  game,  c   is  given.  ) (c x   is  stable  if  the  iterative 
process  
 
(11)    n ,..., 1 i ), x ( f x m
i i
1 m
i = = -
+ , m = 1, 2, … 
 
with  = - ) x ( f m
i i   i’s  best  reply  function,  converges  to  ) c ( x ~   for 




1 = sufficiently  close  to  ) (c x .  This  convergence  requires  (in  the 
                                            
4 Stability of equilibria is discussed, for example, in Puu and Suskho (2002).   11
case  of  a  symmetric  equilibrium)  that  the  matrix  M  of  the  partial  derivatives  of 
) (
m
i i x f - defined  by  diagonal  elements  0  and  identical  non-diagonal  elements 
a b / dx / dx k i - =  has no eigenvalue  l  with  1 ³ l . Apparently (1,…,1) is an 
eigenvector  of  M  with  the  eigenvalue  a b l / ) 1 n ( - - = .  We  conclude  that  stable 
symmetric second-stage equilibria require 
 
(12)    1 ) 1 n ( < -
a
b
  . 
 
 Let us now determine the sign of  i n 1 k dc / ) c ,..., c ( dx  which is used above to define 


















 has constant non-diagonal elements 
 
(13)   
( ) ( )ab a b
b
2 n 1 n
b
2 2 - - - -
=  
 
and constant diagonal elements  
 
(14)    ( )
a






































n 1 i < >
¶ ¶
¶
* =  for strategic substitutes (complements) 
(iii)  ) (
x c
C
) b ) 1 n ( a (
dc




0 0 0 < >
¶ ¶
¶









  for strategic 
substitutes (complements) 
 (iv)  ( ) = - + b 1 n a
( ) ( )
<




2 n 1 n 2 2    0
0 b for b ) 2 n (












Proof:  Strategic  substitutes  (complements)  are  defined  by  0 < b   ( 0 > b ).  Relation 
(12) implies 
 
(15)     ( ) ( ) 0 2 n 1 n 2 2 < - - - - ab a b .  
 
Thus eq. (13) implies  0 b< b  , and therefore  0 / 1 a < < a . Then (i) and (ii) follow from 








) c ,..., c ( dx





* - + =
2





) ( ) 1 ( b ) 1 n (
1
b ) 1 n ( a < > - - - = - +  for  0 < b  ( 0 > b ) which implies  ) 0 ( 0 < > b b . 




Lemma 1 (ii) informs us that, under the above assumptions,  1 h + = for strategic 
substitutes and  1 h - = for strategic complements. The other parts of Lemma 1 are 
utilised in Sections IV and V. 
 
Corollary:  The  Folk  Theorem  described  in  the  Introduction  applies  for  the  naïve 
benchmark. 
Proof: Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 (ii). 
 
IV. The open loop benchmark 
 
We now confront the subgame perfect (closed loop) equilibrium  ( ) c c x ~   ), (  of Game 
CC with the open loop equilibrium or, equivalently, with the equilibrium ( ) *   *,c x  of a 
one-stage benchmark game EC (efficient costs) where technologies and quantities 
are chosen simultaneously. 
 
Assumption: 
(A4)    Game EC has a unique and symmetric equilibrium ( ) * c   *, x . 
   13




) c ,..., c ( dx
,  the  slope  of  the  function  which  describes  the  second 
stage  equilibrium  quantities  with  identical  0 i c c = ,  is  larger  than  the  slope  of 
const c / C 0 0 = ¶ ¶  if and only if 
 
(C1+)  

































Taking into account Lemma 3 (iv), relation (C1+) is equivalent to 





































Condition (C1+) is decisive in the case of strategic complements. Imagine that all 
firms increase their investment by one unit. One effect is the decrease of marginal 
costs, the other is increased market supply which again increases marginal costs. 
Condition  (C1+)  requires  that  the  net  effect  is  deceased  marginal  costs.  (C1-) 
describes the opposite relation, i.e. “larger” is substituted by “smaller” in (C1+). 
 
Proposition 2: Let us assume (A 1), (A 2), (A 3), (A 4). Evaluations with respect to 
the distinction between (strategic) substitutes or complements take place at  *) c *, x ( . 
(i) Strategic substitutes: There is over-investment (under-investment) in Game CC 
according to the open loop benchmark if goods are substitutes (complements). 
(ii)  Strategic  complements:  If  (C1+)  applies  and  if  goods  are  substitutes 
(complements) then there is under- (over-) investment according to the open loop 
benchmark. If relation (C1-) applies, we obtain the opposite result. 
 
Proof: The symmetric equilibrium  *) c *, x (  requires eqs. (2) and (9) to hold for all i. It 
is also a second-stage equilibrium  *) (
* c x x =  of the CC game. Therefore  *) c *, x (  is 
determined  by  the  intersection  of  the  curve  defined  by  eq.  (9)  with  the  curve 
) ,..., ( 0 0 0 c c x . The symmetric equilibrium  ) c ~ , x ~ (  is determined by the intersection of  
) ,..., ( 0 0 0 c c x  with the curve defined by eq. (8) where  z ~  assumes the equilibrium 
  14
value. The slopes of  ) ,..., ( 0 0 0 c c x  and  const c C = ¶ ¶ 0 0 /  are calculated in Lemma 1 
(iii) and Lemma 2.  
 
(i)  In  the  benchmark  game  EC,  the  second  order  condition  for  best  replies  is  a 
negative  definite  Hessian  of  the  profit  function,  i.e. 










2 > ¶ ¶ ¶ - * ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ ¶ - ¶ ¶ * ¶ ¶ a  
which is equivalent to 
 
(16)   
a
i i i i
2 c x / ) x , c ( C ¶ ¶ ¶
 > 





c x / ) x , c ( C





For  strategic  substitutes,  relation  (16)  and  Lemma  1  (iii)  show  that,  at  their 
intersection,  ) ,..., ( 0 0 0 c c x  has a larger slope than  0 c / C i i = ¶ ¶ , i.e. (C1+) applies. 
This implies that all  *) c ( * c c ~ > <  if  0 ) ( z ~ > < , i.e. for substitutes (complements). See 
Figure 2.  
(ii) If (C1+) is fulfilled, then we can argue as under (i). When the relation of slopes 















Figure 2: The equilibrium A of the CC game and the equilibrium B of the EC game in 






0 c / C 0 = ¶ ¶  
0 0 z ~ c / C = ¶ ¶  
 
0 c  
0 x  
0
~ c   * 0 c  
*
0 x  
0
~ x  
) c ,..., c ( x 0 0 0  15
Remark:  ( ) c c x ~   ), (   need  not  be  unique  as  z ~   might  assume  different  equilibrium 
values.  Even  for  the  same  z ~   there  can  be  different  ( ) c c x ~   ), (   if  evaluations  with 
respect to the differentiation between (strategic) substitutes or complements are not 
the same for all symmetric equilibria (in which case the relation of the slopes may 
change for values differing from  * c ). But all the c ~  must be smaller (larger) than  * c  
if goods are substitutes (complements).  
 
The example in Section VI will show that, for strategic complements, (C1+) may or 
may not be fulfilled. There, we will also show that additional stability assumptions 
cannot avoid the distinction.  
 
V. The (second best) welfare benchmark 
 




( ) ( ) ( ) . c , c x C d x , p W
i
i i i i i i i











- ∫ = - x x  
 
Let  us  assume  that  regulatory  measures  are  introduced  only  with  respect  to 
investment. The second stage of the game is still an oligopoly where quantities xi(c) 






















n c ,... 1 c i x

























































- .  
 
Let us now assume: 
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(A5)  The  system  of  equations  (18)  has  a  unique  and  symmetric
5  solution 
( ) 0 0 c ˆ ,..., c ˆ c ˆ = . 
 
We say that there is under- (over-) investment with respect to the welfare benchmark 
if  ( ) 0 0 c ˆ c ~ < > . 
 
The equilibrium quantities implied by c ˆ  are  ( ) c ˆ x x ˆ = .  ( ) c ˆ x  is the same function as in 
the previous sections. We can now proceed as in the last section, except that eqs. (8) 























n c ,... 1 c i x ˆ


















































× =  with a and b defined in eq. 
(13) and (14). For identical  i c  we get ( i k ¹ ) 
 





















































-  have the same sign. In the case “complements and strategic substitutes” we 
need n>2 and a very weak additional assumption, namely 



































For  substitutes,  the  result  of  the  comparison  depends  on  the  question  of  how 
differentiated  the  goods  are.  In  the  case  of  substitutes  and  strategic  substitutes, 
sufficient alternative conditions are: 
                                            
5 As the industry structure in two stage oligopolies often has the character of a natural monopoly or 
oligopoly,  the  second  best  welfare  optimum  may  be  asymmetric.  This  is  therefore  a  strong 
assumption. On the other hand, there are often symmetric optima as the example in Section VI shows.    17
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x  . 
 
(C2-)  limits  the  homogeneity  of  the  goods  while  (C2+)  requires  sufficient 
homogeneity. For n=2 and linear demand functions  k i i x x 1 p g - - = , (C2+) requires 
1 ³ g , i.e. homogeneous goods or “more than homogeneous” goods which may be 
interpreted as “network effects”. With increasing n, the set of cases not covered by 
(C2-) and (C2+) becomes smaller. 
 
In case of substitutes and strategic complements, sufficient alternative conditions are: 
 























































Again, (C3-) limits homogeneity while (C3+) requires enough of it.  
 
Contrary to the last section, we do not assume equilibrium values for the evaluation 
of   i z ~  and  i z ˆ , but we take both as functions of  ) c ,..., c ( c 0 0
s = . In the comparisons 
of  i z ~  and  i z ˆ  below, we assume the same argument  s c .  
 
Note that, as an auxiliary device, we also assume (A4). The reason is that it is far 
easier  to  compare  the  slopes  of    ) c ( x x s
0 0 =   and  0 c / C 0 0 = ¶ ¶   (see  relation 
(C1+)) than those of  ) c ( x x s
0 0 =  and  ) c ( z ˆ c / C s
0 0 0 = ¶ ¶ (or  ) c ( z ~ c / C s






Proposition 3: Let us assume that  (A1) to (A6) apply. 
(i)  Substitutes and strategic substitutes (for all  ) (
s c x ): If (C2+) applies, then 
there  is  over-investment  in  the  CC  game  with  respect  to  the  welfare 
benchmark. If (C2-) applies (which also means n > 2), then there is under-
investment. 
(ii)  Substitutes and strategic complements (for all  ) (
s c x ): If relations (C3-) and 
relation  (C1+)  apply,  then  there  is  under-investment  with  respect  to  the 
welfare benchmark. If relations (C3+) and (C1+) apply, then there is over-
investment. If relation (C1-) applies, we obtain the opposite results. 
(iii)  Complements and strategic substitutes (for all  ) (
s c x ): For n > 2, there is 
under-investment with respect to the welfare benchmark. 
(iv)  Complements and strategic complements (for all  ) (
s c x ): If relation (C1+) 
applies there is over-investment with respect to the welfare benchmark. If 
relation (C1-) applies, we get the opposite result. 
 
Proof: (i) and (C2-): Eq. (20) and Lemma 2 (ii) and (iv) imply 
 
(21)      0 z ~
x
p
bx ) 1 n ( z ˆ i
k
i
i i < =
¶
¶
- < .  
 
For  the  remaining  argument  let  us  look  at  Figure  3.  In  the  case  of  strategic 
substitutes, (C1+) always applies, i.e. the slope of   ) c ( x s
0  is larger than the slope of 
0 / 0 0 = ¶ ¶ c C . For the unique welfare optimum  0 c ˆ , the slope of  ) c ( x s
0  has to be 
larger than the slope of  ) c ( z ˆ c / C s
0 0 0 = ¶ ¶ . Otherwise either a second solution of 
the system of equations (18) would exist (contradicting (A5)), or   ) c ( z ˆ c / C s
0 0 0 = ¶ ¶  
would have to enter the region of positive  0 z ˆ  (contradicting  relation (21)). In addition, 
relation (21) shows that  ) c ( z ˆ c / C s
0 0 0 = ¶ ¶  lies below  ) c ( z ~ c / C s
0 0 0 = ¶ ¶ .  0 c ~  is 
not necessarily unique, but all  0 c ~  must be larger than  0 c ˆ . 
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Figure 3: Under-investment under the welfare benchmark when  0 z ~ z ˆ i i < <  and 
when (C1+) applies. 
 
(i) and (C2+): From eq. (10) and Lemma 2 follows  0 z ~
i <  while eq. (20) and Lemma 2 
(iv)  imply  0 z ˆi > .  Taking  this  difference  into  account  in  Figure  3,  we  get  over-
investment. 
(ii) and (C3-): From eqs. (10) and (20) and Lemma 2 follows  0 z ˆi <  and  0 z ~
i > . If 
relation  (16)  applies,  we  can  again  use  Figure  3  to  show  that  under-investment 
results. If relation (C1-) applies, the slope of   ) c ( x s
0  is smaller than the slope of 
0 / 0 0 = ¶ ¶ c C  and we obtain the opposite result. 
(ii) and (C3+): In situation (ii), (C3+) implies  0 z ~ z ˆ i i > > . When relation (C1+) applies, 
then over-investment occurs. Otherwise there is under-investment. 
(iii): From eqs. (10) and (20) and Lemma 2 follows  0 z ˆi <  and  0 z ~
i > . So we have 
the same situation as in (ii) and (C3+). 
(iv): Because of (A6) we get 
 
(22)    0 z ~
x
p
bx ) 1 n ( z ˆ i
i
i
i i < =
¶
¶





























0 ˆ c   0
~ c  
*
0 c  
) ( 0
s c x  
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Therefore, if (C1+) applies, we are in the situation of Figure 3 again. If relation (C1-) 
applies, the slope of  ( ) s
0 c x  is smaller than the slope of  0 c / C 0 0 = ¶ ¶  and we obtain 
the opposite result. 
■  
 
VI. An example 
 
Let us assume linear demand and constant marginal costs. Fixed costs are quadratic 
in  i c . 
 
(23)    ∑ - - =
¹i k
k i i x x 1 p g . 
 
(24)    ( ) 0 s , r , x c c
2
s
rc C x , c C i i
2
i i i i > + + - =  . 
    
Thus we get  2 - = a  and  g b - = , where  b a   and    are defined in Section III as the 
















. With the same matrix, 
















































   
From (13) and (14) we get the unique second stage equilibrium 
 
(26)    n ,..., 1 i , ) c 1 ( b ) c 1 ( a x k
i k
i i = ∑ - - - - =
¹
  with 
   




- - + -
=    and 
2
b ) 1 n ( 1
a
g - +
- = . 
 
For identical  0 i c c =  we get 
(27)    ( ) 0 0 1 ))
2
1 ( ) 1 (
2
1
( ~ ~ c b n x x i - - - - = =
g
 . 
The equations   21
 

























are the first stage requirements of the closed loop equilibrium (with 0 instead of  0
~ z  for 
the open loop equilibrium). Thus the system of equations (25) and (28) determines 
the  closed  loop  equilibrium  ) c ~ , x ~ (   and,  for  0  instead  of  0
~ z ,    the  open  loop 
equilibrium  *) c *, x ( . For an interior second best welfare optimum  ) c ˆ , x ˆ ( ,  in (28),  0
~ z  











1 ˆ 0 0 n for x z
g
g
. In every case, a system of symmetric 
linear  equations  has  to  be  solved  which  generically  leads  to  a  unique  symmetric 
solution.  
 
For  0 > g , the goods are substitutes and competition is in strategic substitutes. For 
0 < g , they are complements and competition is in strategic complements. Therefore, 
we  always  have  over-investment  according  to  the  naïve  benchmark.  (Corollary  to 
Proposition  1  and  Lemma  1).  In  the  case  of  strategic  substitutes  we  get  over-
investment  according  to  the  open  loop  benchmark  in  the  case  0 < g   and  when 
relation (C1+) applies (Proposition 2). (C1+) is, for n = 2, equal to 
 







For   1 ³ g  and, for   0 < g  when relation (29) applies with “smaller instead of “larger”, 
over-investment  occurs  according  to  the  welfare  benchmark;  for  0 < g   and  when 
relation (29) applies, there is under-investment (Proposition 3).  The region  1 0 < < g , 
is  not  covered  by  Proposition  3.  A  direct  computation  reveals  3 / 2 = g   to  be  the 
separating line.  
 
Figure 4 indicates parameter regions with over- and under-investment for the three 
benchmarks. Some limits on g  and s are also indicated. The Hessian of the profit 
functions in game EC is a negative definite matrix only if  2 / 1 s > . For game CC, eq. 
  22
(8)  provides  us  with  i i dc / dG   and  we  find  that  0 dc / G d 2
i i
2 <   is  equivalent  to 
) b ) 1 n ( 1 (
2














s . The second order conditions for 
a  welfare  maximum  are  always  fulfilled.  According  to  relation  (12),  stability  is 
equivalent  to  ) 1 n /( 2 ) 1 n /( 2 - < < - - g .  Note  that  Cournot  competition  with 
homogenous goods  ) 1 ( = g  and constant marginal costs is not stable
6 for  3 n ³ .  
 
Note that, depending on s and g , r must take appropriate values to guarantee interior 
solutions with  1 c 0 0 £ £  (see eq. (27)). So, in Figure 4, we cannot assume constant 
r, but for every s and  g  the indications “over-/under-investment” apply for those r 
which guarantee interior solutions. 
 
 
Figure 4: Quantity competition with n = 2, linear demand functions eq. (23), and 
constant marginal costs eq. (24). g = 1 is the case of homogeneous goods.  
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not covered by Proposition 3 
3 / 2 = g    23
Would  we  get  rid  of  certain  distinctions  if  we  would  introduce  additional  stability 
requirements? First, such requirements are far less convincing for the game EC or 
the  first  stage  of  the  game  CC.  Investment  is  more  or  less  irreversible  while 
production can easily be changed. Second, they would not help. In the example, we 
find stability in both cases. If competition is in strategic complements, then game EC 
is always stable. After the redefinition of the technology variable  i c  as  i c - , it is easy 
to see that EC is a supermodular game and, due to our assumption of a unique 
equilibrium, this equilibrium is globally stable (Vives, 2000, p. 54). 
 
VI. Summary and conclusion 
 
The investigation of price competition is relegated to the appendix. The joint results 
are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
The  results  with  respect  to price  competition  are nearly  the  same as for  quantity 
competition. Note, however, that the weak assumption (A6) is not needed in the case 
of  price  competition.  The  conditions  (C1),  (C2),  (C3)  are  rather  similar  but  not 
identical. (C1-) describes cases in which all producers investing the same additional 
amount has a negative net effect on marginal costs (taking into account increased 
equilibrium production in the second stage). (C2+) and (C3+) both require goods to 
be  sufficiently  homogeneous,  (C2-)  and  (C3-)  require  them  to  be  sufficiently 
heterogeneous. 
 
We can see in Table 1 that the Folk Theorem applies only for the naïve benchmark. 
Additional  conditions  determine  the  outcome  for  the  other  two  benchmarks.  It  is 
interesting  that  under  the  welfare  benchmark  with  sufficiently  homogeneous 
substitutes and strategic substitutes, n = 2 may be special. Such a result is also 
found  by  Elberfeld  (2003).  It  should  be  easy  to  generalize  the  investigation  with 
respect to cooperation of the producers in the first stage. Other benchmarks may turn 
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Table 1: Under- and over-investment under different benchmarks. Net inv. eff. – or 
net inv. eff. + mean: (C1-) or (C1+) apply. Low heterogeneity means: (C2+) or (C3+) 
apply, high heterogeneity means: (C2-) or (C3-) apply. 
 
The paper relies on assumptions (which should always apply) and conditions (which 
may  or  may  not  apply).  Conditions  (C2)  and  (C3)  have  an  easily  interpretable 
meaning. Condition (C1) is more technical. The question remains whether it can also 
be given a more elementary interpretation. The most restrictive assumption in this 
paper is symmetry. There is little hope, however, to generally deal with asymmetric   25
cases except in the special case n = 2 or under special assumptions such as where 
only two technologies are available (Elberfeld, 2003). We can assume that the above 
results  also  hold  under  “nearly  symmetric”  circumstances  and  thus  offer  us  a 
reference  for  principal  policy  decisions.  For  essentially  asymmetric  cases,  only 
numerical simulations seem to be possible. 
 
The message of this paper is that investment in two stage models (with a symmetry 
assumption) can indeed be qualitatively characterized. It is, however, necessary to 
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Appendix: Price competition 
 
Demand  for  the  (potentially)  heterogeneous  goods  is  described  by 
( ) ( ) 0 p / x , p ,... p p , p x i i n 1 i < ¶ ¶ = ; costs are as in (1). The firms compete with prices; 
otherwise  the  games  CC  and  EC  are  as  described  in  Section  II.  Thus  i  enjoys 
profits ( ) ( ) i i i i i i x , c C p x p G - = .  In  the  second  stage  of  the  CC  game  the  (interior) 
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- . This system of best replies determines the 
second-stage equilibrium  ( ) n i c pi ,..., 1 , = . The first stage equilibrium  c ~  of the game 











































































Contrary to (31), cost efficiency requires 
 
















For equilibrium values, the difference between eqs. (31) and (32) is 
 

































Because of  0 dp / dx i i <  and the relations (1),  0 / )) ( , (
2 2 < ¶ ¶ i i i i p p x c G , the curves 































~  takes 
the equilibrium value) have the slope   0
p / x c x / ) x , c ( C
c / ) x , c ( C
dc
dp
i i i i i i i
2
2




¶ ¶ * ¶ ¶ ¶
¶ ¶
- = . 
i i i i i z ~ c / ) p ( x , c ( C = ¶ ¶  lies below (above)  0 c / C i i = ¶ ¶  if  the sign of  
p
i z ~  is positive 
(negative). “Below” means that the same  i c  values are connected with smaller  i p  
values. 
 
Definition: Evaluated at ( ) c ~   , x ~ , we set   1 : g + = if all  0 p / x k i < ¶ ¶ , i.e. if goods are 
complements  and    1 : g - = if  all  0 p / x k i > ¶ ¶ ,  i.e.  if  goods  are  substitutes.  We 
define  0 dc / dp all if 1 : h k i > - =  and  0 dc / dp all if 1 : h k i < + = .  
 
Note that the definition of h corresponds to that in the case of quantity competition. 
1 : h + =   means  that  increasing  i c   induce  decreasing  prices  and  increasing 
quantities. For price competition, 
p














Figure 5: The equilibrium A of Game CC and the cost efficient production D in the 
case  0 z ~p
i >  (case  1 h g + = * ). 
D 
i c ~
  * ~
i c  
i p ~
 
i c  
A 
p
i i i z c C ~ / = ¶ ¶
0 / = ¶ ¶ i i c C    29
Proposition  4:  If  ) 1 ( 1 h g - + = *   then,  according  to  the  naïve  benchmark,  x ~  is 
produced with under-investment (over-investment). 
Proof: See Figure 5. 
 
As  in  the  case  of  quantity  competition  we  investigate  symmetric  equilibria.  The 
derivatives  k i dc dp /  can again be computed with the Implicit Function Theorem. a  
and  b   are  defined  by  the  second  derivatives  of  Gi  with  respect  to  prices,  but 
otherwise the arguments are exactly the same as in Section III.  
 
Lemma 3: The following derivatives are valuated at symmetric and stable equilibria. 
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 for strategic substitutes (complements), 
(iii)   
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for strategic substitutes (complements). 
(iv)  ( ) = - + b 1 n a
( ) ( )
<




2 n 1 n 2 2    0
0 b for b ) 2 n (












Proof:  As  proof  of  Lemma  1.  Note  that  in  eq.  (6)  the  second  derivatives  of  Gi 
(including a  and b ) are defined now with respect to prices. 
■  
 
Corollary:  The  Folk  Theorem  described  in  the  Introduction  applies  for  the  naïve 
benchmark. 
Proof: Proposition 4 and Lemma 3 (ii). 
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) c ,..., c ( dp
,  the  slope  of  the  function  which  describes  the  second 
stage  equilibrium  quantities  with  identical  0 i c c = ,  is  larger  than  the  slope  of 
const c / C 0 0 = ¶ ¶  if 
 
(C1p+)    
















































Taking into account Lemma 3 (iv), relation (C1p+) is equivalent to  
 
(34)   
( ) ( ) 0
c
C
  of   slope
p / x p c / C
c / C
































- + = .
■  
 
Proposition 5:  
(i) Strategic substitutes: There is over-investment (under-investment) in Game CC 
according to the open loop benchmark if goods are substitutes (complements). 
(ii)  Strategic  complements:  If  (C1p+)  applies  and  if  goods  are  substitutes 
(complements) then there is under- (over-) investment according to the open loop 
benchmark. If relation (C1p-) applies, we find the opposite result. 
 
Proof: (i): The arguments are the same as in Proposition 2. In the benchmark game 
EC the best replies of firms fulfil eq. (30) as well as (32), i.e. firms produce with 
minimal  costs.  The  second  order  condition  for  best  replies  is  a  negative  definite 
Hessian  of  the  profit  function  which  implies 
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Figure 6: The equilibrium A of Game CC and the equilibrium B of Game EC in the 
case of complements and strategic substitutes, i.e.  0 ~ >
p
i z  ( 1 + = *h g ). 
 
(ii): If (C1p+) is fulfilled then we can argue as under (i). When the relation of slopes 
changes, we get opposite results 
■  
 
For  strategic  substitutes,  relation  (35)  and  Lemma  3  (iii)  show  that  relation  (34) 
applies. The uniqueness of  *) c *, x (  means that  *) c ( * c c ~ > <  applies for  0 ) ( z ~ > < , i.e. 
for substitutes (complements). 
 
Welfare is measured as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus, i.e. 
 
(36)  ( ) ( ) ( ) . c ), c ( p x C )) c ( p ( x ) c ( p d ) c ( p , x W
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x x  
 
Let  us  assume  regulatory  measures  only  with  respect  to  investment;  the  second 
stage of the game is still an oligopoly where prices  ) (c pi  are chosen. An interior 
(second best) optimum then requires 
 
) c ,..., c ( p 0 0 0  
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0 c / C 0 = ¶ ¶  
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0 0 z ~ c / C = ¶ ¶
  32


































































































As in the case of quantity competition, we assume that the system of equations (37) 




p c ˆ ,..., c ˆ c ˆ = . 
 
We say that there is under- (over-) investment with respect to the welfare benchmark 
if  ( ) p
0
p
o c ˆ c ~ < > .The equilibrium quantities implied by  p c ˆ  are  ( ) p p c ˆ p p ˆ = .  ( ) p c ˆ p  is the 
same  function  as  in  the  previous  sections.  We  can  now  proceed  as  in  the  last 







































× =  with a, b defined in eqs. (13) and (14). 
For identical  i c  and taking into account (38) and Lemma 2, we get ( i k ¹ ): 
 



























































For substitutes, the result of the comparison depends again on the question of how 
differentiated  the  goods  are.  In  the  case  of  substitutes  and  strategic  substitutes, 
sufficient alternative conditions are: 
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(C2p-)  limits  the  homogeneity  of  the  goods  while  (A7p+)  requires  sufficient 
homogeneity.  
 
In case of substitutes and strategic complements, sufficient alternative conditions are: 
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Proposition 6: Let us assume that  (A1) to (A5) apply. 
(i)  Substitutes  and  strategic  substitutes  (for  all  ) c ( x s
0 ):  If  (C2p+)  applies 
then there is over-investment in the CC game with respect to the welfare 
benchmark. If (C2p-) applies then there is under-investment. 
(ii)  Substitutes  and  strategic  complements  (for  all  ) c ( x s
0 ):  If  (C3p+)  and 
relation  (C1+)  apply  then  there  is  under-investment  with  respect  to  the 
welfare benchmark. If (C3p-) and relation (C1+) apply then there is over-
investment. If relation (C1p-) applies, we get the opposite results. 
(iii)  Complements and strategic substitutes (for all  ) ( 0
s c x ):  There  is  under-
investment with respect to the welfare benchmark. 
(iv)  Complements  and  strategic  complements  (for  all  ) ( 0
s c x ):  If  relation 
(C1p+)  applies  there  is  over-investment  with  respect  to  the  welfare 
benchmark. If relation (C1p-) applies we get the opposite result. 
 

















* * - - = . In the case of complements, the pendent to (A6), 






















































x ,  is  always 
fulfilled. 